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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This action is an appeal from a decision rendered by the
Seventh Judicial District Court on a Petition
Final

Determination

For

Review

of

a

made by the Director of the Utah Department

of Health on a medicaid application.

The Court of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a~3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether federal and state statutes and regulations mandate that a State Medical Assistance
Program may not include the income of any relative, except that of a parent or spouse, in
the calculation of a child applicant's eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
Whether federal law and regulation are violated
by any Medicaid eligibility calculation which
deems Social Security benefits which are paid
through a representative payee to be available
to any person but the specific beneficiary.

3

DETERMINATIVE LAW
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17(D):
A State plan for medical assistance must...
include reasonable standards (which shall be
comparable for all groups and may, in accordance with standards prescribed by the
Secretary, differ with respect to income
levels, but only in the case of applicants
or recipients of assistance under the plan
who are not receiving aid or assistance
under any plan of the State approved under
title I, X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of title
IV, [42 USCS §§301 et seq., 1201 et seq.,
1351 et seq., 1381 et seq.], based on the
variations between shelter costs in urban
areas and in rural areas) for determining
eligibility for and the extent of medical
assistance under the plan which... do not
take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant
or recipient of assistance under the plan
unless such applicant or recipient is such
individual's spouse or such individual's
child who is under 21 or (with respect to
States eligibile to participate in the
State program established under title XVI
[42 USCS §§1381 et seq.]), is blind or
permanently and totally disabled, or is
blind or disabled as defined in section 1614
[42 USCS § 1382c] (with respect to States
which are not eligible to participate in
such program); and provide for flexibility
in the application of such standards with
respect to income by taking into account,
except to the extent prescribed by the
Secretary, the costs (whether in the form
of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred
for medical care or for any other type of
remedial care recognized under State law;...
42 U.S.C. §603(a) (38):
A State plan for aid and service to needy
families with children must- ...
(38) provide that in making the determination
under paragraph (7) with respect to a depen4

dent child and applying paragraph (8), the
State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part [42 USCS §§601 et seq.])
include(A) any parent of such childf and
(B) any brother or sister of such childr if
such brother or sister meets the conditions
described in clauses (1) and (20 of section
406(a) [42 USCS §606(a)]r if such parent,
brother, or sister is living in the same
home as the dependent child, and any income
of or available for such parent, brother, or
sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with
respect to the family (notwithstanding section 205(j) [42 USCS §405(j)], in the case
of benefits provided under title II [42 USCS
§§401 et seq.]); and
42 C.F.R. §435.113:
The agency must provide Medicaid to individuals who would be eligible for AFDC
except for an eligibility requirement used
in that program that is specifically prohibited under title XIX.
42 C.F.R. §435.692(a)(1) and (2):
(a) Except for a spouse of an individual
or a parent for a child who is under
age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency
must not(1) Consider income and resources of any
relative available to an individual; nor
(2) Collect reimbursement from any relative
for amounts paid by the agency for
services provided to an individual.
U.C.A. §26-18-3(2):
The department [Department of Health] shall
be the single state agency responsible for
the administration of the medicaid program in
connection with the United States Department
of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title

5

XIX of the Social Security Act. (2) The
department shall develop implementing policy
in conformity with the requirements of Title
XIX and with regulations adopted pursuant
thereto by the federal agency.
Utah DSS-APA Manual, Vol. IIIf §327.32:
1•

Count the income of the parents and the child
when the child lives with his parents. This
includes children in non-AFDC foster care that
have been placed in their own homes (see Sec.
213.5) .
For B, and D cases, a child is
considered living with his parents
until the month after he moves.
For F and C cases, a child is
considered living with his parents
while temporarily absent from the
home, such as for school, vacation,
summer employment, medical treatment,
etc.

2.

Count only the income of the child, including
support payments made by the parents, in the^e
situations:
F and C Cases - when the child is living
away from his parents and it is not
temporary.
a. This includes a child in Foster Care that
has not been placed back in his own home
(see Sec. 213.5).
b. This includes a child in AFDC foster care,
no matter where he lives.
c. This includes a child living with a specified relative, and it is not temporary.

B and D cases - when the child lives separate
from his parents - for any reason. A child is
considered living with his parents until the
month after he moves.

6

42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2):
(1) When it appears to the Secretary that the interest of an applicant entitled to a payment would
be served thereby, certification of payment may be
mader regardless of the legal competency or incompetency of the individual entitled thereto, either
for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use
and benefit to a relative or some other person.
(2) Any certification made under paragraph (1) for
payment to a person other than the individual entitled to such payment must be made on the basis of
an investigation, carried out either prior to such
certification or within forty-five days after such
certification, and on the basis of adequate evidence
that such certification is in the interest of the
individual entitled to such payment (as determined
by the Secretary in regulations). The Secretary
shall insure that such certification are adequately
reviewed.
42 U.S.C. §408(e):
Whoever... (e) having made application to receive
payment under this title for the use and benefit of
another and having received such a payment,
knowingly and willfully converts such a payment,
or any party thereof, to a use other than for
the use and benefit of such other person; ...
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
42 U.S.C. §1302:
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, respectively, shall make and publish such
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with
this Act, as may be necessary to the efficient
administration of the functions with which each
is charged under this Act.
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20 C.F.R. §404.2035(a):
A representative payee has a responsibility tola) Use the payments he or she receives only for
the use and benefit of the beneficiary in a manner and for the purposes he or she determines,
under the guidelines in this subpart, to be in
the best interests of the beneficiary;....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 30, 1986, a Petition For Review was filed in the
Seventh Judicial District Court requesting that the Final

Deter-

mination of the Director of the Utah Department of Health, whicl
denied Medicaid benefits to Jerry Grandson,
bitrary

as ar-

and capricious for having ignored federal and state lawi

and regulations.

(C.T. pp. 1-17)

moved to dismiss the Petition.
1986,

be reversed

the

Dismiss.

On June 23, 1986, the Directo
(C.T. pp.

18-19)

On

July

District Court entered an Order denying the Motion T
(C.T. pp. 38-39)

On July 14, 1986, the Director filed an Answer to
Petition

7

(C.T. pp.

40-42)

and

th

a Certification Of Transcript

Papers, And Documents.

(C.T. pp.

Jerry

a Memorandum Of Points and Authorities I

Grandson

filed

Support Of Petition For Review.

47-79.)

On August 13, 1986

(C.T. pp 80-89.)

16, 1986, the Director filed her Reply Memorandum.

On

Septembc

(C.T. pp. 1(

- 129.)
On September 12, 1986, the Director moved for leave i
file

a third-party complaint against the Secretary of the Unit

8

States Department of Health and Human Services.
91.)

(C.T. pp. 90-

On November 11, 1986, the District Court denied the motion.

(C.T. pp. 169-170.)
On February 12, 1987, Jerry Grandson requested a ruling
on the Petition (C.T. pp.

191-192)

On February 23,

1986, the

District Court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the Petition
to

reverse the Final Determination of the Director.

193-194.)
1987.

The Decision was formalized in the Order of March

30,

(C.T. pp. 201-202.)
On March 23,

peal.

(C.T. pp.

1986, Jerry Grandson filed a Notice Of Ap-

(C.T. pp. 196-197.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1985, Jerry Grandson applied for medical

under

the

state

Medicaid plan.

composed of 5 members:

assistance

Jerry Grandson's household is

his mother, sister, two nieces adopted by

his mother, and himself. (C.T. pp. 70-71)
of these children is deceased,

As one or both parents

each child in the household is a

recipient of Social Security Survivor benefits. Jerry Grandson's
personal benefits total about $158.00 per month.
On

(C.T. p. 69)

July 25, 1985, the District VII (B) Office of Com-

munity Operations denied

Jerry

Grandson's

application

on

the

ground that the total income available to meet Petitioner's medical

obligation

is

in excess of $666.00:

the basic maintenance

standard for a household of five. (C.T. p.75.)

9

In arriving at

this determination,
come

both

Jerry

the District Office deemed as available

Grandson's

Social

Security benefits and also

those Social Security benefits received by
nieces.

in-

his

sister

and

two

(C.T. p. 74)
Jerry Grandson submitted a written appeal of this denial

to

Administrative

Hearing

Officer

decision by the District Office.
appeal

argued

that

deeming

of

Neal Bernson to contest the

(C.T. pp.

62-68,

76-77)

benefits

belonging

to

The

Jerry

Grandson's sister and nieces as being available as income to hiir
violated federal law and regulations which preclude such deeming.
The

appeal

with

Utah

also

pointed out that such deeming was inconsistent

Assistance

Payments

Administration

regulations.

Finally, the Hearing Officer was advised that, because the Socia]
Security

Survivor's

Jerry's mother,
received

for

benefits

were

paid

to

as a representative payee,

his

nieces

Nellie

any use of

Grandson,
benefits

and sister to pay for Jerry's medica

bills would be contrary to federal law.
On December 20,

1985, the administrative

Hearing

Of

ficer, although refusing to address any legal arguments raised b
Jerry

Grandson

decision.

(C.T. p.60.),

(C.T. pp. 53-60.)

sustained

the District Office'

The Recommended Decision of the ad

ministrative Hearing Officer was adopted by the Director
Utah

Department of Health,

Suzanne Dandoy,

mination dated March 14, 1986.

of

th

in her Final Deter

(C.T. pp. 48-52.)

The Director's Final Determination addressed the legal
10

issues previously ignored by the hearing officer.
tion stated that the Deficit
below),

Reduction

Act

of

The Determina1984

("DEFRA",

P.L. 98-369, §2640, required the Department of Health to

count the income of Jerry Grandson's siblings as being
to him in determining his medicaid eligibility.
However,

in explaining what she

Director

did

not

termed

"the

available

(C.T. p.
whole

51.)

law", the

deal with the problem that DEFRA only amended

Title IV of the Social

Security

Act,

and

left

unchanged

the

provision against deeming of relatives' income found in Title XIX
(Medicaid)

of

the

Act.

sentative payee status,
pointing

out

Families

With

abolished

that

In

the

the

Dependent

to

Director

changes

again

made

Children)

in

relied

on

DEFRA,

the Title IV (Aid To

eligibility

statute

also

the representative payee bar to deeming sibling income

as available in AFDC cases.
than

addressing the problem of repre-

state

(C.T. pp.

50-51.)

However, other

that "the whole law" mandated the same abolition

for Medicaid cases, the Director did not explain how

DEFRA

had

altered Title XIX, which Congress did not amend.
On

May

30,

1986, Jerry Grandson filed a Petition For

Review in the Seventh Judicial District Court which alleged
the

decision

that

of the Department of Health concerning calculation

of the income available to a child

Medicaid

applicant

violated

certain federal and state laws and regulations, and was therefore
arbitrary and capricious.

(C.T. pp. 1-3.)

On February 23, 1987,

the District Court entered a Memorandum Decision holding that the
11

income calculation was correct under existing law and regulation
and

denying the petition to alter the Final Determination of tfc

Department of Health.

(C.T. pp. 193-195.)

Specifically, the Court stated..."that no particular lc
or regulation should be isolated and treated as the final
in

a

Medicaid eligibility determination,

and thereby sustain*

the Director's action of utilizing the DEFRA amendments
eligibility

to

alter

eligibility

word,

to AFI

under the unamended Medica

statutes and regulations. An Order to this effect was signed ai
entered on March 30, 1987.

(C.T. pp. 201-202.)

Jerry Grandson filed his Notice Of Appeal on
1987.

March

2

(C.T. pp. 196-197.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

benefits,
Medicaid
Health.

appellant,

Jerry

under Title XIX of
program

is

Grandson,
the

administered

Social
by

applied
Security

the

In determining Jerry's eligibility,

Utah

for Medica
Act.

T

Department

the Social Securi

Survivor's benefits income received by Jerry, two nieces, and I
sister

were

deemed to be available to him as resources to co\

his medical expenses.

This totalling of income

ineligible for Medicaid benefits.
of

Health

rendered

Jej

The Director of the Departm<

upheld this determination by stating that the Defi<

Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) mandated that the

income

of

s

lings be counted in both AFDC cases, under Title IV of the Soc

12

Security

Act, and in Medicaid cases under Title XIX of the Act.

This determination ignored an unamended section of Title XIX
U.S.C.

§1396a(a)(17) (D)) which bars state agencies from counting

sibling income
Director's

in

Medicaid

decision

eligibility

determinations.

counting

sibling income in Medicaid eligibility determinations.
by ignoring these federal statutes and regulations,
circumvented

Utah

law (U.C.A.

Medicaid program.

of

Finally,

the Director

§26-18-3(2)) which requires that

the Department of Health obey federal law in
its

The

also ignored federal regulations (42 C.F.R.

§§ 435.113 and 435.602(a)(1) and (2)) which bar the

of

(42

the

administration

The Director's decision represents a

sweeping and unauthorized expansion of amendments to Title IV of
the

Social

Security

eligibility law.
law

Act

into

an

alteration

In making this expansion,

of

Title

XIX

unambiguous federal

barring the counting of sibling income was ignored,

and the

Director's determination was therefore arbitrary and capricious.
The Medicaid eligibility
Director

essentially

held

that

determination

upheld

by

the Social Security Survivor's

benefits of Jerry Grandson's siblings were available to meet
financial obligations for medical treatment.
paid to Nellie Grandson,
payee.

Jerry's

the

mother,

as

his

These benefits are
a

representative

Federal law and regulation (42 U.S.C. §405(j)(l) and (2),

42 U.S.C.

§408(e),

and 20 C.F.R. §404.2035(a)) make it unlawful

for a representative payee to use monies received by them for the
obligations of any person other than the actual beneficiary.
13

The

Director's determination thus forces the representative payee
violate
this

federal

law.

result, noting

The Director relies on DEFRA to justify
that

the

eligibility determinations.
(Medicaid)

eligibility

to

bar

was

waived

in

Title

IV

But DEFRA has no effect on Title XI?

standards,

and the bar against allowinc

representive payments to be used for persons other than

the ac-

tual beneficiary has not been lifted in Medicaid cases.
ARGUMENT
I.

FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS DICTATE
THAT THE INCOME OF SIBLINGS AND OTHER RELATIVES,
EXCEPT THAT OF PARENTS OR SPOUSE, MAY NEVER BE
DEEMED AS AVAILABLE TO A CHILD-APPLICANT FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS IN A DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICANT'S
ELIGIBILITY.

Section
Code,

1396a(a)(17)(D), of

mandates that a State

determining

the

eligibility

plan
of

for
an

Title

42, United State

medical

assistance, i

individual

for

Medicai

benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act,
...[may] not take into account the financial responsibility of any individual for
any applicant or recipient of assistance
under the plan unless such applicant or
recipient is such individual's spouse or
such individual's child.... (Emphasis
supplied)
This statute has never been amended by Congress.
Consistent with the terms of this statute,
Federal Regulations,

the Code

at §435.602(a) (1) and (2), of Title 42, (

a section entitled "Limitation on the financial responsibility

14

relatives") states
[e]xcept for a spouse of an individual or
a parent for a child who is under age 21...
the agency must not - (1) consider income
and resources of any relative available
to an individual; nor (2) collect reimbursement from any relative for amounts paid...
to any individual. (Emphasis supplied.)
This regulation
limitation

of

is

42 U.S.C.

clearly

set

out

§1396a(a)(17)(D).

to

enforce

the

The regulation has

never been altered by the Department of Health

and

Human

Serv-

ices.
Utah

is obliged to follow federal law and regulation in

its implementation of the medical
§26-18-3(2).

Utah's

Department

assistance
of

program.

Health

has

U.C.A.

codified its

eligibility rules for the Medicaid program in its DSS-APA Manual.
Volume IIIf
that,
only

in

§327.32 of the Manual instructs eligibility
determining

workers

the income of an unemancipated childf

,f

[c]ount the income of the parents and

the

child."

to

This

provision is an unambigous restatement of the federal statute and
regulations.
In summary, valid federal and state statutesf regulation
and

rules

consistently

mandate

that

a

state

agency

making

Medicaid eligibility determinations may never count the income of
a relativef such as a brotherf sister, or niece,

as being avail-

able to a child-applicant.
Federal and state agencies (as is true in the present

15

case)

have adopted the position that in determining the Medicaid

eligibility of children,
eligibility

state agencies must apply the financial

requirements of the State's Aid to Families With De-

pendent Children (A.F.D.C.) plan.
IV

of

Under the amendments to Title

the Social Security Act (covering A.F.D.C),

made by the

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (D.E.F.R.A.) P.L. 98-369, §2640, ar
eligibility determination for a dependent child must count income
available to a brother or sister.
Secretary

of

the

42 U.S.C.

Department of Health and Human Services,

reliance of the change made by DEFRA,

has

agencies

in

to

count

sibling

income

also
any

required

ii

stat<

determination

eligibility for Medicaid benefits under Title XIX.
and

Tin

§602(a)(38).

The

o:

federa

state agencies have argued that this interpretation of DEFR

by the Secretary is entitled to such great weight as to
positive

of

the

issue

be

dis

of the conflicting statutes and regula

tions.
The problems with this position
Through

DEFRA,

Congress

are

readily

apparent

may have expressed its intent to amen

eligibility requirements for AFDC benefits under Title IV of tlr
Social Security Act, but it expressed no similar intent to chanc
any

part of Title XIX of the Act dealing with Medicaid benefits

Indeed,
of

§1396a(a)(17)(D) is still a viable and unamended sectic

Title

XIX and clearly denies the states any right to inclu<

relatives1 income (other than that of
eligibility

determinations.

And,
16

a

spouse

or

parent)

although the Secretary's i

terpretation

of statutes are entitled to some weight,

ignore clear statutory authority absolutely
pretation.
the

barring

he cannot

his

inter-

The Secretary's interpretation, in any event, ignores

Secretary's

own

regulations, which

state

at

42

C.F.R.

§435.113
[t]he agency must provide Medicaid to individuals who would be eligible for AFDC except
for an eligibility requirement used in that
program that is specifically prohibited under
Title XIX. (Emphasis supplied)
Every decision,
Judicial

except the present one from the Seventh

District, has rejected the position of the federal and

state agencies and upheld the plain meaning of §1396a(a)(17)(D).
In

Vance

v.

Hegstrom (1986 9th Cir.) 793 F.2d 1018, the Ninth

Circuit observed of DEFRA
[t]he statute finally enacted by Congress
which required states to include sibling
income when determining AFDC eligibility
is directed solely to the provisions
of 42 U.S.C. §602, which is a component
of the AFDC statute, and not to subsection
(17)(D). (Emphasis supplied.)
Id.r at p. 1025. The Court also held that the Secretary's interpretative authority was not unlimited and, in setting eligibility
standards, section 1396a (a) (17) (D) could not be ignored.
p.1024.

Other courts have made identical holdings,

bar the counting of relatives' income.

Reed v.

Ind. 1986) 639 F.Supp. 130; Olson v. Reagen (S.D.

M . , at

all of which

Blizinger (S.D.
Iowa 1986) 631

F.Supp. 154; Gibson v. Puett (M.D. Tenn. 1985) 630 F.Supp. 542;
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Malloy v. Eichler (D.Del. 1986) 628 F.Supp. 582; Sandberg v. Mansour (W.D. Mich.

1986) 627 F.Supp.

616; Childress v.

Heckle

(D.Colo. Jan. 13f 1986) No. 85-7-1459.
The law on this matter is unambiguous:
is

absolutely

sister,

barred

from

counting

the

or niece as being available to an

applicant for Medicaid benefits.

a

state

agenc

income of a brother
unemancipated

child

The Final Determination of th

Director of the Department of Health upheld the inclusion of

in

come from Jerry Grandson's sister and nieces in the assessment o
his eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
violation

of

federal

Such inclusion is done i
TY

and state statutes and regulations.

final Determination of the Director is

therefore

arbitrary

ai

capricious and must be reversed.
II.

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS PAID TO A REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE MAY ONLY BE USED FOR THE
ACTUAL BENEFICIARYf AND STATE MEDICAID
PLANS MAY NOT DEEM SUCH INCOME PAID TO
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A SIBLING AS BEING
AVAILABLE TO AN APPLICANT FOR MEDICAID
BENEFITS.

The

Social Security Act permits the Secretary of Heal

and Human Services to appoint a trustee to
behalf

of

a

beneficiary.

beneficiary,
42 U.S.C.

"representative payee".

to

be

§405 (j) .

receive

benefits

used in the interest of th
This

trustee

is

termed

Title 20, section 404.2035(a),

Code of Federal Regulations,

states that a representative

must

18

of t
pay

"use the payments...she receives only for
the use and benefit of the beneficiary
in a manner and for the purposes...she
determines...to be in the best interests
of the beneficiary;...." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 408(e) of Title 42, makes it a felony to use the benefits
paid

to

a

representative payee for anyone other than the named

beneficiary.
In some households, several persons may be receiving Social Security
State

benefits

paid

through

a

representative

payee.

benefit programs have frequently written their eligibility

rules in a
household

manner

which

income.

As

cumulates
a

this

consequencef

benefits may have those benefits denied

income

as

a

single

a single applicant for
through

attribution

of

this household income.
These

eligibility

rules regarding cumulation of repre-

sentative payee benefits have been struck down in the past.
Snider v.

In

Creasy (1984 6th Cir.) 728 F.2d 369, the Court of Ap-

peals held that such deeming violated

federal

regulation

in a

determination of eligibility for AFDC benefits. The Court noted
The federal regulations governing the administration of benefits through a representative payee specifically require the
payee to use "the benefits of the beneficiary
in a manner and for the purpose, he or she
determines...to be in the beneficiary's best
interest." [citation] The representative payee's
discretionary role in spending on the beneficiary's behalf is abrogated by [the State's]
policy. The practical effect of this policy
is to directly allocate these funds to one
other than the intended beneficiary, thereby
eliminating the representative payee's discre19

tion to determine how benefits should be
spent on the beneficiary's behalf. Such an
abrogation is impermissable. Moreover, the
duties and obligations imposed upon the
representative payee, are federally mandated
and failure to fulfill these obligations can
expose the representative payee to criminal
liability. (Emphasis supplied)
M . r at p. 372; accord, Riddick v. D'Elia (1980 2d Cir.) 626 F.2c
1084.

These

decisions

deny

states any authority to cumulate

benefits paid through a representative payee.
After these decisions were issued.

Congress enacted th<

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, §2640.
tor

of

As the Direc-

the Department of Health pointed out in her Final Deter-

mination, DEFRA (codified as 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(38)) declares tha
for purposes of AFDC eligibility
A State plan for aid and services to
needy families with children must(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect
to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8) , the State agency shall (except
as otherwise provided in this part) include(B) any brother or sister of such child,
if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2)
of section 606(a) of this title, is such
parent, brother, or sister is living in
the same house as the dependent child,
and any income of, or available for such
parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and
applying such paragraph with respect to
the family (notwithstanding section 405 (i)
of this title, in the case of benefits
provided under subchapter II of this
chapter) [Emphasis supplied].
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The apparent significance of the parenthetical reference
to §405 (j) is the removal of any bar to

the

deeming

of

repre-

sentative payee income in AFDC cases. However, the courts are in
conflict

on

this

point,

remove the deeming barf
and is enforceable.
F.Supp.

641,

Insurance)

some

have found that DEFRA does

while others agree that it still

Ardister v.

[Title

payments

for

II

(Old

Mansour (W.D. Mich. 1986) 627
Age

Survivor

and

Disability

made to the representative payee of a child

beneficiary must be deemed available for common use to
plicants

under

F.Supp.

249,

exists

DEFRA];

Collins v.

Barry (N.D.

253 ["...OASDI benefits paid to

a

AFDC

ap-

Ohio 1986) 644
representative

payee in trust for a minor beneficiary cannot be deemed as income
available

to

the family generally but are restricted to use for

the sole benefit of the minor beneficiary."]; Whitehorse v. Hecklex

(D.S.D.

reference
repeal

627

F.Supp.

848f

855

in §2640(a) to §205(j) [sic] ...

the

0.A.S.D.I.

1985)

prohibitions
benefits

which
by

clearly

anyone

["...the ambiguous
is not sufficient to

outlaw

other

the

than

use
the

of

named

beneficiaries...."].
Whatever
courts,

the

outcome

of

this

conflict

between

the

one message is clear in their differing opinions: DEFRA

amends only AFDC eligibility rules, and to the extent the representative

payee

bar

is

removed at all,

regard to AFDC eligibility determinations.

it is only removed in
This is

clear

the terminology of §2640 itself, which refers only to AFDC
21

from

eligibility

under

Title

IV.

DEFRA amends no rules regarding

Medicaid eligibility under Title XIX.
Because DEFRA does not amend Title XIXf
deeming Social Security Survivorfs benefitsf
resentative

payee,

as

being

available

Medicaid remains intact and unchanged.

the bar againsl

paid through a rep-

to

an

applicant

fo

It is therefore a viola

tion of federal law and regulation to attribute

such

income ai

available to a Medicaid applicant.
Jerry

Grandson's

benefits through
Federal

Nellie

nieces and sister received Survivor1
Grandson

as

a

representative

payee

law barred that income from being deemed as available t

meet any financial obligation of Jerry Grandson.
Determination

of

the

Director

Yet the

Fina

of the Department of Health le

stand a Medicaid eligibility assessment which in fact deemed tha
representative payee income as being available to Jerry.
consequence,

the

As

Final Determination ignored federal law.

cause the Director is obligated

by

Utah

law

to

obey

Be

federa

statutes and regulations in the administration of the medical as
sistance program, her Final Determination is arbitrary and capri
cious, and must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Jerry
In

determining

Grandson
his

applied

eligibility,

for Medicaid benefits in 198!
Social

Security

Survivor

benefits received through a representative payee to his sister
22

and

two nieces were deemed to be income available to him.

This

eligibility decision was upheld by the Director of the Department
of Health in her Final Determination.
42 U.S.C.
authority

to

§1396a(a)(17)(D) denies

state

statute,

the

Act.

This

tions,

were not amended by the Deficit Reduction
only

any

attribute income from a sibling as being available

to a Medicaid applicant under Title XIX of

which

agencies

allows

Social

Security

and its related federal and state regulaAct

of

1984,

the counting of sibling income in the deter-

mination of eligibility for benefits under Title IV of the Social
Security Act (Aid to
Medicaid

Families

cases, state

With

Dependent

Children).

In

agencies may only count the income of an

applicant's parent or spouse as being available to the applicant.
42 U.S.C.
received

by

the

§408(e)

provide

that

benefits

a representative payee may only be used for the ac-

tual beneficiary.
over

§405(j) and

issue

While the federal courts are in

disagreement

of whether DEFRA removed this bar in the deter-

mination of eligibility for AFDC, they appear to agree

that

such

It would

amendment has taken place in regard to Medicaid.

no

therefore violate these statutes, and their related regulations,
to deem benefits received through a representative payee as being
available to a Medicaid applicant.
The

Final

Determination of the Director of the Depart-

ment of Health is invalid on two independent grounds.

First, it

counts the income of Jerry's siblings as being available to him,
23

although such deeming is barred by §1396a(a)(17)(D).

Second, i

counts income paid through a representative payee as being avail
able to Jerry,

although that deeming is barred

by

§405 (j) an

§408(e).
To

reach

Director had to
federal
cious.

the

result

deliberately

and state law.

of her Final Determination,
side-step

fixed

and

tY

unambiguoi

Such a manuever is arbitrary and caprj

The Final Determination must therefore be reversed.

Date:

XtfOy /<?%/

Steven Boos
DMA-PEOPLE'S LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellant and
Petitioner
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ADDENDA
1.

Memorandum Decision

2.

Order

3.

Final Determination

4.

Recommended Decision

5.

Childress v, Heckler
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
i

JERRY GRANDSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,
vs.
SUZANNE DANDOY, in her capacity
}
as Executive Director of the
Utah Department of Health,
]

Civil No. 4902

Respondent.
The petitioner has filed a petition with the Court
seeking a judicial review of the final determination of the
respondent wherein the petitioner contends that the respondent
acted capriciously in adopting the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law recommended by the Hearing Officer in this
case.

It is the contention of the petitioner that the Hearing

Officer and the Director capriciously misapplied the law and
applicable regulations when they determined that the
petitioner, who is a child applicant, was not eligible for
medical assistance payments.

The sole legal issue is whether

the Director is correct when she included the income available
to all household members of petitioner's family in calculating
the amount of income available to the petitioner as it applies
to his eligibility for medical assistance payments.
The Court has reviewed the memorandums submitted by
the petitioner and the respondent and the applicable laws and

regulations and has concluded that the laws and regulations
relative to the payment of medical assistance must be read and
construed in their totality, and that no particular law or
regulation should be isolated and treated as the final word.
The Court has further concluded that the director's conclusion
is not contrary to those laws and regulations, and that the
Director was not acting capriciously in her actions in this
case.
Therefore, the Court denies the petitioner's
application for alteration of the final order of the respondent
The Attorney for the respondent is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

f^~

J ^ day of February, 1987.

y
<

? *

7-/

BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge

-page 2-

DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472)
Attorney General
STUART W. HINCKLEY (4051)
Division Chief
BRIAN L. FARR (1037)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-7642

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JERRY GRANDSON

:

Petitioner,

:

-v-

:

ORDER
SUZANNE DANDOYf in her capacity :
as Executive Director of the
Utah Department of Health,
:
Respondent.

Civil No. 4902

:

This matter came before the Court on appeal from an
administrative hearing in the Department of Health pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 26-23-2.

Having reviewed the record, the

memoranda submitted by counsel and the applicable laws and
regulations, the Court has concluded that the laws and
regulations relative to the payment of medical assistance must be
read and construed in their totality, and that no particular law
or regulation should be isolated and treated as the final word.
The Court has further concluded that the Director1s Final
Determination is not contrary to those laws and regulations, and
that the Director was not acting capriciously in her actions in
this case.

NOW THEREFORE it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1.

Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent

affirming the Final Determination of the Executive Director of
the Department of Health; and
2.

The relief requested by Petitioner is denied.

DATED this 2£l_

day of

J^/^V//i//

, 198/.
S/

/ HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL
/ District/<5ourt Juclge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of
the foregoing Judgment, postage prepaidf to the following:
Steven Boos, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
DNA - People's Legal Services, Inc.
P.O. Box 488
Mexican Hatf Utah 84531
Brian L. Farrf Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84114

on t h i s the 30Zl

day of /AxV^

, 1987.
r
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F I N A L

D E T E R M I N A T I O N

Having reviewed the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Fair
Hearing Officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Social
Services, incorporated herein, and having found that they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

That the aforementioned recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law be
sustained, and that the Hearing Officer's recommended decision be affirmed.
In doing so, the Department of Health (the "Department"
unmindful of the position advanced by claimant.

or "DOH") is not

In this regards, the Department has, as above, reviewed and scrutinized the
whole record and also reviewed relevant: 1. state and federal legislation;
2. CFR citations; 3. legislative histories and agency directives, including
federal Health and Human Services ("HHS") advisories regarding relevant
regulatory measures passed thereunder; and 4. pertinent court decisions, both
state and federal, regarding the present issue(s) before the Department.
DOH, under authority of Section 26-18-3 UCA and as implemented by contract
with the Utah Department of Social Services ("DSS") through DSS's Office of
Community Operations' ("0C0") District Office ("district") network,
has
designated DSS as the eligibility determinating agency for the Utah Medical
Assistance Program, Section 26-18-1, et. seq. UCA, commonly called Medicaid.
In determining eligibility for Medicaid, the district office utilizes the
procedures and standards established by DSS which are condensed in written
form in Volume III, "Medical Assistance," of DSS's Assistance Payments
Administration (APA) determination guidelines. Such procedures and standards
being a compilation of relevant state and federal law and directives
thereunder.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
3180 STATE OFFICE BUILDING • PO BOX 45500 . SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84145-0500 • (801)533-6111
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
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While on a day-to-day basis, in large measure the district office refers to
this manual for daily guidance and direction, it, the district, must and is
guided also by aV[ pertinent state and federal law, both statutory/regulatory
and case law.
From a review by the Department of such relevant materials it can as a
starting point be stated that the key issues and determinative factors as
regards claimant's el1g1bility/1ne1ig1bility center on:
1.

Defining the "assistance unit" or, more precisely, the "filing unit"
and,

2.

Applying such definition(s) to the present factual situation
determining appropriate family contribution or "deeming"
determining the eligibility of claimant.

as to
as to

At first glance and upon cursory review of claimant's position, it would
appear that only claimant's monthly income of $158.00 and not that of his
siblings can be included in claimant's eligibility determination.
(Ihis
excluding for the moment any "deeming" of claimant's mother's income which
apparently was initially ignored by the district office). For by reference to
certain CFR citations, namely 20 CFR 404.2035 which in part states:
"A representative payee has a responsibility to (a)

Use the payments he or she receives only for the use and benefit
of the beneficiary in a manner and for the purposes he or she
determines, under the guidelines in this subpart, to be 1n the
best interests of the beneficiary;"

and from 42 CFR 435.602 we read in part:
(a) Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for a child who
is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not (1) Consider income and resources of any relative available to an
individual; nor
..."
Also reference to the case law in this area would on first glance appear to
further bolster claimant's contention.
Johnson v. Harder, C.A. Conn. 1925.,
512 F. 2d 1188, certiorari denied 96 S. Ct. 149. Snider v. Creasy, C.A. Ohio
Q ? 8 4 ) 728 F. 2d 369. Chaddick v. Adult and Family Services Division, 1981,
632 p. 2d 33, 53 Or. App. 508.
If our inquiry stopped at this point, claimant's position would seemingly be
dispositive.
What must be viewed is the underlying intent of the legislation setting up the
determination process and the status of the whole law at the time claimant
walked into the district office.
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From 20 CFR 404.1 we read:
The regulations in this Part 404 (Regulations No. 4 of the Social Security
Administration) relate to the provisions of Title II of the Social
Security Act as amended on August 28, 1950 [42 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.],
and as further amended thereafter.
By reference to 42 U.S.C. 405 (j) we find the foundation authorization for 20
CFR 404.2035 regarding representative payees wherein we read 1n part:
42 USC 405 (j)
(l)When it appears to the Secretary that the interest of an applicant
entitled to a payment would be served thereby, certification of payment
may be made, regardless of the legal competency of the individual entitled
thereto, either for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use and
benefit to a relative or some other person.
From 42 USC 602 (a) (38) we read:
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with
respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency
shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include (A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister
meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section
606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in
the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available
for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such
determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family
(notwithstanding section 405 (j) of this title, in the rase of
benefits provided under subchapter III of this chapter); and . . .
(Emphasis added)
[Paragraphs (7) and (8) dealing with the $1,000 family ceiling and
$75/$l60 earned income disregards; clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a)
defining "dependent child."]
Clauses (A) and (B) of 602 (a)(38) stating that "in
determination . • • the State agency shall . . . include -

making

(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child . . . (Emphasis added)

the

- 4 Such parents and siblings being viewed as part of the "filing unit." (See
HHS Transmittal No. SSA-AT-86-1 , dated January 13, 1986, a copy of which
is attached).
Further from clause (B) we read:
" . . .and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister
shall be included in making such determination . . . (notwithstanding
section 405 (.i) of this title . . . "
(Emphasis added) (Note: And by
implication "notwithstanding 20 CFR 404.2035")
The above referenced section 42 USC 602 (a) (38) being an amendment and
addition as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and effective as of July
18. 1984 Pub. L. 98-369, Title VI, Section 2640.
Such being a specific statutory response and legislative overriding of case
law as embodied in Johnson v. Harder and Snider v. Creasy; with such
legislation for all practical purposes doing away with representative payee
"limitations" (at least as regards AF0C related determinations). (See also in
this regards 45 CFR 206.10 (a)(l)(v11)).
Even prior to the Congress 1 declaration, the courts 1 have (had) been
undermining the representative payee "for the use and benefit of the
beneficiary" position. See Summers v. D f Elia I9i)3, 465 NYS 2d, 95 A.0. 2d
184. Korbel v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. PA Commw. Ct. No. 976 C D . 19/8
(December 12 f 1979).
"-"**
In applying the whole law to claimant when he presented himself via his
mother f s application on his behalf on April 22, 1985 it is clearly evident
that the filing unit included: a) claimant; b) claimant's mother (even
before the July 18, 1984 section 42 USC 602 amendments); and c) claimant's
siblings; and all of their available income as a family unit no matter in what
form received - whether directly or indirectly via a representative payee or
otherwise.
Analysis as regards sections 325 and 327 of Volume III of the APA further
bolsters the district office's determination when read in light of the above
congressional and regulatory enactments rather than negating it as claimant
would assert*
It follows presumptively assuming that the district office's $ figures are
correct that with or without the claimant's mother's income being included
that the district's denial was appropriate and correct based on inclusion of
the siblings' income.
Accordingly, as above, the Hearing Officer's recommended decision is hereby
affirmed.
It is further ordered that a copy of this final determination be sent to the
claimant at his last known address by certified mail, return receipt
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requested; to his attorney of record by certified mail, return receipt
requested; and to the appropriate District Office and/or other state agency
for action in accordance herewith.
An appeal from this final determination may be secured pursuant to Utah
Ann. Section 26-23-2 (1953 & Supp. 1983) by filing a petition in
appropriate District Court of the State of Utah within 30 days after
final determination is received. Failure to file such a petition within
30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of all right to appeal
determination.

DATED this !H

day of

Vfl<l ^

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

y&

/Oe^>^tcr
Suzanne/^lndoy, M.D., M.P.H,
Executive Director

^

1986,

Code
the
this
the
this

\r

y

0^
m a —^
a
SOCI3l wGrVICGS

Norman H Banaerter, Governor, StaH of Utah
NormanQ Angus, Executive Director

FAIR
H E A R I N G
I N T E R E S T O F
Jerry Grandson

R E C O M M E N D E D

INT H E
)
11/85 #9

)

)

D E C I S I O N

The above entitled matter having been regularly heard before the Fair
Hearing Officer of the Office of Administrative Hearings, of the Department
of Social Services, and proper notice having been given the claimant, and
all of the facts, circumstances, and rights of the claimant having been duly
considered:
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: That the decision by the District VII
(B) Office of Community Operations that all household members and income
must be considered 1n determining excess income is hereby sustained. Refer
to Volume III, §§325 and 327,
Dated this

< £ p ^

day of

December

19 85 .

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

^7A^^
NeaK Bernson
Fair Hearing Officer

Office Of Administrative Hearings
Bill L.Walker, Director

150 Wast North Tempi*. Fourth Floor
P ° Box 45500. Salt Lake City .UIth84HS 0500
801-533-73oo & D3o~tJ5oO

An Equal Opportunity Employer

FAIR HEARING SUMMARY

10/85 #9
Medical Assistance
District VII (B) OCQ-APA

Hearing Held through Correspondence
Neal Bernson, Hearing Examiner
I.

ISSUE:
The claimant requested a hearing on August 28, 1985, to appeal a decision
by the District VII (B) Office of Community Operations in requiring
excess income to be paid to qualify for Medical Assistance. On September
5, 1985 the claimant's representative and the district office were notified that the hearing would be conducted through correspondence. On
September 17, 1985 the district office summarized their position in a
brief* A copy was provided to the Office of Administrative Hearings and
the claimant's representative. The claimant's representative made a
response on September 24, 1985. Upon review of the claimant's representative's brief, the district office made a response on October 1, 1985.
A final response was then made by the claimant's representative on
October 3, 1985, which was received by the Office of Administrative
Hearings on October 7, 1985.
District Office's Summary:
On September 17, 1985, the district office representative stated, through
correspondence, that on April 22, 1985 the claimant's mother applied for
Medical Assistance in behalf of her son. The claimant's mother was asked
to verify the monthly household income. She failed to provice verification of her household Income; and, therefore, her application was denied.
On June 19, 1985 the family reapplied for Medical Assistance. She verified that their monthly income from Social Security was $1,432.00. There
are six people 1n the household, so their monthly excess income was
determined to be $766.00. On July 25, 1985, the district office sent
the claimant a Notice of Decision, and a Form 417-A that explained how
much the family would have to pay for the Medical ID Card. On July 31,
1985 the family had not made any contact with the district office, so
their second application for Medical Assistance was also denied. The
denial action is based on Volume III, §325.1 which states that all children must be included in the assistance unit, and §327.3 and 327.32 which
requires one to deem all income of the family because the only programs
for which the claimant could qualify is either F or C category. Based
on these regulations, the district office counted the total Income of the
family to determine an MAO excess income payment.
Claimant's Representative's Response:
The claimant's representative stated that the district office's representative, while not citing any authority, states that the only ground for
denying the Medical Assistance 1s excess income arrived at by totaling
the claimant's family's Social Security income. The claimant accordingly
limits his response to the Issue of the income calculation.
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ISSUE:
Claimant's Representative's Response:

(continued)

In two letters to a district office worker, dated August 29, and August
30, 1985, the claimant's representative outlined the claimant's arguments
against the Income calculation made 1n his case. The claimant would like
these letters to serve as his main brief 1n this appeal.
To briefly recapitulate the arguments of those letters, 1t should first
be noted that under 42 U.S.C., §1396a, a state Medical Assistance program
must comply with certain federal guidelines. A state program also cannot
require applicants to violate federal law. The Code of Federal Regulations, at Title 42, §435, sets out eligibility rules to be followed by
state assistance programs. Section 435.602 (quoted 1n the August 30,
1985 letter) makes 1t Improper for a state program to use an eligibility
calculation which considers the Income of child applicant's relative,
except a parent, to be available to the child. As a result, when determining the eligible Income of a child, the state formula may only total
the income of the child and Its parents, and may not add 1n the income
of any other relative.
As a separate matter, 20 C.F.R., §404.2035, makes it unlawful for Social
Security payments, made to a representative payee, to be used for any
person other than the beneficiary. Thus, a state Medical Assistance
program which requires a representative payee to total family beneficiary
payments by holding that the aggregate amount is available to any single
member of the family would violate federal law.
Here, the district office's MAO-Excess Income Computation has calculateda group Income by totaling the Social Security payments made to the
claimant and his brothers and sisters. These payments are made to the
claimant's mother as a representative payee. By totaling these sums, the
district office assumes that the income of his siblings is available to
meet the obligations of the claimant. Such a calculation violates the
dictates of 20 C.F.R., §404.2035 and 42 C.F.R., §435.602.
The proper calculation would be to determine the claimant's eligibility
based upon his Income and that of his parents, excluding income from his
siblings. Such a calculation would put him well within the Assistance
Payments Administration's Table II, Basic Maintenance Standard.
Such a result does not seem to be inconsistent with Utah regulations.
As noted in the letter of August 29, 1985, Volume III, §325, of the
Assistance Payments Administration's Manual states quite clearly that,
"[t]he decision of who to cover under a Medical Assistance grant 1s different than the decision of whose income to count." Simply because
coverage of all the claimant's siblings may be required dies not mean
that the district office may use an income calculation which assumes
their income 1s available to him. And, in line with the federal regulations, §327.32 just as clearly states that a child's eligibility is calculated by counting only the Income of the child and its parents.

-3ISSUE:
Claimant's Representative's Response:
(continued)
As a matter of federal and Utah law, the medical excess of $766.00 for
the claimant 1s erroneous. Under a legally valid calculation there 1s
no excess, and the district office's denial of assistance is improper.
On October 3, 1985 the claimant's representative responded to the district office representative's Memorandum of October 1, 1985, regarding
the claimant's appeal. The district office representative cited Volume
III, §327.32, as authority for the denial of the claimant's application
for Medical Assistance, stating that this section, "...requires one to
deem all Income of the family...." Therefore, the total income of the
family was counted to determine an MAO excess payment. However, §327.32
clearly states that when an unemandpated child lives with his parents,
as does the claimant, the income of only the parents and the child is to
be counted. The inclusion of the income of the claimant's siblings in
the calculation to determine the claimant's eligibility was not in accor
dance with the regulations. Therefore, §327.32, when applied correctly,
qualifies the claimant for Medical Assistance under the APA, Table II,
Basic Maintenance Standard.
The claimant's representative noted that the district office representative's suggestion that the claimant's mother's Social Security income,
not figured into the original MAO excess income calculation would add to
the total excess payment. However, this suggestion, unsubstantiated by
any evidentiary submission, 1s not properly a part of this appeal, as th
e claimant's mother's income was not used as grounds for the original
denial in this case. Therefore, the district office representative's
statement concerning the claimant's mother's Social Security income cannot be considered in reaching a decision in this appeal.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The claimant's mother applied for Medical Assistance for her one son.
In the home is one other child and two grandchildren the claimant's
mother has legally adopted. The application was for MNC Medical Assistance to cover some medical expenses for the claimant. The household's
income 1s Social Security benefits computed by the district office as
follows:
Child
Child
Child
Child

No. 1. (Grandchild)
No. 2. (Grandchild)
No. 3. (Mother's Child)
No. 4. (Mother's Child)
Total Household Income

$

558.00
558.00
158.00
158.00
$1,432.00

-4II.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

(continued)

The district office considered the above Income of $1,432.00. From this
was deducted the Basic Maintenance Standard of $666.00, leaving the
claimant with $766.00 1n excess Income. The district office has now
stated that the claimant's mother's Social Security benefits will also
have to be considered 1n the calculation, significantly Increasing the
excess Income to be paid by the claimant. The claimant's representative
contends that the district office has Improperly applied the intent of
the existing Volume III and federal regulations to the claimant's circumstances. The Volume III procedures that he feels have been applied
Incorrectly to the claimant's case, are Volume III, §§325 and 327.3.
These procedures state as follows:
Volume III, §325
"Deciding Who to Cover - Non-Nurs1nq Home Cases
The decision of who to cover is different than the decision
of whose income to count. For policy on whose Income to
count, see Section 327 (Deemed Income).
If a client can qualify under both coverage groups (A, B
and D ) , or (F and C ) , he may choose the group he wants.
325.1

Who Must be Covered - F and C Cases
The decision of who to cover depends on two factors:
1.

The relationship of certain relatives to the
person who wants coverage.
When a child applies for coverage, with few
exceptions, all of his parents, stepparents,
brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters,
adopted brothers, and adopted sisters whom he
lives with must be included in the case.
When a parent applies for coverage, with few
exceptions his spouse and children whom he lives
with must be Included in the case.

and

2.

The eligibility of these relatives for the same
category as the person who wants coverage.
For instance, a parent might qualify for F or C
category, depending on his age. A child may
qualify for either category based upon the eligibility of his parents for the F case.

-5II. FINDINGS OF FACT: (continued)
Do not include someone who is not eligible, such
as someone over age 18, on a C case.
If parents and dependent children qualify for F
and C cases at the same time, open only the F
case.
Volume III9 §327.3
Whose Income to Count
327.31

For an Emancipated Child
When a child 1s emancipated, count only his income.

327.32 For an Unemandpated Child
1. Count the Income of the parents and the child
when the child lives with his parents. This
includes children in non-AFDC foster care that
have been placed in their own homes (See Sec.
213.5).
For B, and D cases, a child is considered living with his parents until the month after he
moves.
For F and C cases, a child
ing with his parents while
from the home, such as for
summer employment, medical
2.

is considered livtemporarily absent
school, vacation,
treatment, etc.

Count only the income of the child, including
support payments made by the parents, in these
situations:
F and C Cases - when the child 1s living away
from his parents and it is not temporary.
a. This includes a child in Foster Care that
has not been placed back in his own home
(see Sec. 213.5).
b. This Includes a child in AFDC foster care,
no matter where he lives.

-6II.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

(continued)
c.

This Includes a child living with a specified relative, and 1t 1s not temporary.

B and D Cases - when the child lives separate
from his parents - for any reason. A child 1s
considered living with his parents until the
month after he moves.11
In considering the above procedures, the claimant's representative contends that the Social Security checks are made out for the children, and
each payment 1s reserved to the beneficiary and cannot be applied to the
obligations of any other person. By totaling all benefits, assumes that
the Social Security payment made to the claimant's mother for her adopted
grandchildren is available to her children for use and benefit. Consequently, the calculation would be illegal under federal law. The claimant's representative feels that a proper calculation would have been to
consider only the claimant with total unearned income of $158.00 available to him. Each other child receiving Social Security benefits would
then have their own Social Security for themselves. Therefore, under the
proper intent of Volume III, §§325 and 327, the regulations allow the
district office to consider the total household number of five, but only
consider the income available to the one son needing Medical Assistance
which would be well under the $666.00 Basic Maintenance Standard. Consequently, calculation made 1n harm of federal law on Social Security
payments leaves no MAO excess, and benefits cannot be denied. The claimant's representative also contends that 42 C.F.R., §435.602, discusses
financial eligibility requirements for state Medicaid plans, and states
as follows:
M

(a)

(1)
(2)

Except for a spouse of an individual or a parent for
a child who is under age 21 or blind or disabled,
the agency must notConsider Income and resources of any relative available to an Individual; nor
Collect reimbursement from any relative for amounts
paid by the agency for services provided to an individual. "

The claimant's representative feels that the above procedures taken out
of the federal regulations support his conclusions that you cannot consider all household and all income in determining the amount of excess
income to be collected for and in behalf of the claimant with a medical
need.
The Hearing Examiner finds that the decision by the District VII (B)
Office of Community Operations 1s correct in their calculations of excess
income based on the income of the four children. The claimant's mother's
Social Security Income, however, is also countable income. This should

-7FINDINGS OF FACT:

(continued)

be verified, and the correct amount of excess income determined. The
district office has correctly Interpreted the intent of Volume III, §§325
and 327. Under the claimant's mother's household circumstances wherein
she has two children and two legally adopted grandchildren, all minor
children and their income would have to be counted in the determination
of Medicaid excess income for any child seeking Medical Assistance. The
claimant's representative also raises several questions relative to the
application of the federal regulations. The Hearing Examiner will not
respond to the legal arguments as stated by the claimant's representative. However, they are being made part of the record; and, therefore,
can be reviewed by legal counsel of the Department of Health. All correspondence between the claimant's representative and the district office
will be forwarded to the Department of Health for review.
RECOMMENDED DECISION:
The Hearing Examiner recommends that the decision by the District VII (B)
Office of Community Operations that all household members and income must
be considered in determining excess income is hereby sustained. Refer
to Volume III, §§325 and 327.
FINAL DETERMINATION:
The Department of Health sustained the Hearing Examiner's recommended
decision.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

This 1s to certify that I have mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Hearing Decision and Order to Jerry Grandson, the Claimant; Steven
Boos, the Claimant's Representative; Nancy Stone, Good Samaritan Medical
Center; and Steve Wilcox, District Office Director,
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Proceedings before the HONORABLE ZITA L. WEINSHIENK,
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6

(The arguments of Counsel are not herein transcribed,

7

pursuant to the direction of ordering counsel.

8

proceedings then were had and entered of record:)

9

The following

RULING

10

THE COURTt

The question that's before the Court today

11

is an important one.

12

as a deficit reducing measure which restricts the scope of AFDC

13

payments or appears to, by in large, affect scope of financial

14

resources considered in determining whether a family is

15

eligible for AFDC Payments.

It involves a statute passed by Congress

16

The Court notes that an agency's interpretation of a

17

statute that it administers is entitled to some deference by

18

the Court; and the interpretation of a statute which is

19

reflected in agency regulations needs to be reasonable and

20

consistent with the underlying statute.

21

interpretation does not have to be the only reasonable

22

interpretation; it has to be a reasonable interpretation

23

consistent with the statute.

24

case, 380 U.S. 1, 1964, case and others.

And the agency's

This are cites on thatt the Udall

I want to thank the attorneys for the excellent job of

25

L

1

briefing that was done and lot the really extraordinary extra-

2

good arguments that were made this morning.

In view of the

,3

briefing and in view of the arguments, which I must say sort of

4

firmed up my thoughts after reading the briefs, the Court will

5

decide this matter in the following way?

6

both sides that 1 do not intend to issue a written opinion.

7

think there is lots' of written opinions, some of which has been

8

very thorough in their analysis.

9

the record; and if this is going to be appealed

And let me say to
I

Out what I say now will be on
in this circuit,

10

you can ask the reporter for a transcript.

So let me

11

incorporate by reference verbally my findings and my

12

conclusions.
It would appear that the--from the legislative history,

13
14

from the language of t h e — o f DEFRA, the Deficit Reduction Act,-

15

602--let's s e e — 4 0 2 United States 602(a) (38), that the intent

16

of Congress is clear that the income of dependent children

17

should be included in the family unit which files for AFDC

18

benefits.

19

included in the filing unit be, quote/unquote, "needy."

20

Section 602(a)(38) incorporates clauses 1 and 2 of 606(a).

21

That's pretty technical, perhaps, that "needy" does not lie

22

within those clauses.

23

There is no requirement that I see that the children

But in any case, if I were to adopt plaintiffs'

24

interpretation of this statute, basically we would make

25

602(a) (38) ineffective.

It would apply in so few cases, it

4
1

would apply only to the "grandmother giving somebody an

2

unrestrictive support" type of case.

3

Title II cases for the most part, nor in child support cases,

4

for the most part} and those two considerations were

5

specifically intended by Congress to apply, from reading

6

act.

7

talks about child support.

It would not apply in

Subsection 38 does talk about Title 11.

this

Subsection 39

8

I don't intend to read 602(a)(38) out of existence.

9

This court does not make law; this court looks at the law as

10

made by Congress and tries to interpret it reasonably; and in

11

interpreting it reasonably, this does include the income of

12

these dependent children in the family who receive Title VII

13

(sic) child support and other payments in the family unit.

14

From a policy viewpoint, one understands why this was

15

done.

16

the whole real family unit to see what that unit's income is,

17

whether it's a half sibling or a whole sibling or whether one

18

child is getting Social Security and another isn't.

19

sense because one uses Social Security payments, where you do

20

have a family which is needy or dependent, in paying rent and

21

food.

22

It makes sense from a policy point of view to look at

It makes

Mow* it would appear to me that there really is no

23

need, for the agency to have individualized hearings to conclude

24

on a case-by-case basis whether there is financial need or

25

whether this child's benefits are available for the other

1

members of the family.

In the great majority of the cases — and

2

it would appear to me all the cases represented by the

3

plaintiffs here—the children do qualify for inclusion into the

4

filing unit by being deprived of the care of one parent; and

5

there doesn't have to be this case-by-case basis.
I recognize that there may be some isolated cases.

6
7

tried to think of some.

8

with some, where because of a child's deformity they need

9

special clothes or perhaps because of their size, or maybe

I

It was very hard for me to come up

10

because there is a musical genius who needs special musical

11

lessons.

12

by an after-the-fact hearing rather than a before-the-fact

13

hearing.

14

that there be a hearing before determining these benefits,

15

where the statute is very clear in its intent and in its policy.

16

The question is raised in the briefs primarily,

And those cases can be handled, it would appear to me,

I don't see that there is any due process

requirement

17

although it's been touched on—whether

18

Congress intended to repeal by implication the criminal

19

provisions of 408(e), which prohibit a custodial payee from

20

spending Title II benefits on anyone other than the child

21

qualifying for them.

22

in passing 602(a) (38),

It appears to me to some extent to be really a highly

23

technical argument, because in most cases where you apply the

24

benefits for the child receiving the Title II benefits for rent,

25

for food, the others are receiving incidentally the benefits of

those payments.

But even where one might — if the amount

received is large and one might spend it on specific things for
other children f such as clothes or baby foodf for example,
which wouldn*t apply to the child receiving the Title II
benefit, it would seem to me that clearly by enacting DLFKA,
Congress did impliedly indicate that the criminal

sanctions

would not apply in the cases where DEFRA does apply.

And 1

think that has to be implied; so whether you want to call it an
implied repeal of the application of the criminal penalties if
the suspending is because of the family following the mandates
of DEFRA, the fact of including those children in the family
unit, or whether you want to just say that the criminal
sanctions would not applyf

I don f t know how that you want to

hypothetically—what you want to call it, it seems clear to me
that there could not be these criminal penalties if, in fact,
the provisions # the requirements of 602(a) (38), are being
followed.
So the court agrees, then, with the holding or the
reasoning in Huber v« Bllnilnqer, which is the case from the
Northern District of Indiana, a 1985 case, in holding

that

Congress did not intend the criminal sanctions to apply in this
type of situation dealing with Title II benefits.
As to child support payments, I conclude that Congress
explicitly included child support payments within the financial
resources to be included by the AFDC filing unit.

The first

1

$50 Is exempt.

2

unit; and I think that is clear from the Congressional mandate,

3

from the statute and the regulations.

4

support payments are included within the AFDC Filing does not

5

constitute any unconstitutional taking of property.

6

Child support over $50 is included within the

The fact that the child

1 would conclude that the statute and the regulations

7

permissibly require families receiving AFDC Payments to include

8

such support payments in the resources of the unit; and this

9

condition of receiving benefits does not violate any

10

constitutional provisions, the 5th or 14th Amendments' property

11

clauses, or the contract clause of the Constitution.

12

As to Medicaid eligibilty, the issue of Hedicade

13

eligibility is whether consideration of a sibling's income is

14

within the meaning of the phrase "financial responsibility of

15

any individual for any applicant or recipient," which is found

16

at 42 United States Code

17

does not talk about siblings.

18

and I'm not persuaded by the Secretary's argument concerning

19

the legislative history.

20

history is weak and although Congress may have intended to

21

reF*;«.ict financial burdens on children caring for older parents,

22

they were very specific in their language.

23

spouse and parent.

24

as Medicaid is concerned, nothing in the statutory or the

25

regulations deem a sibling's come to be such as to reduce

1396 (a) (17) (d).

Now, that section

It talks about spouse and parent;

I agree with the plaintiff that the

They talked about

Nothing is said about siblings; and as far

8

1
2

Medicaid payments.
! think when we look at this in a public policy point

3

of view, also, the example that was given or that was

A

considered when I was discussing this with the attorneys for

5

the defendant—defendants—make it clears

6

income may actually be reduced by the effect of DEFRA; and it

7

doesn't make any sense at all to—while you're reducing it to

8

also cut out the Medicaid payments when there is nothing that

9

says they must be cut out.

A family's AFDC

So on this issue, I go along with

10

the case law and agree with the courts which have uniformly

11

upheld the plaintiffs' position on Medicaid.

12

Let me just touch on constitutional arguments that

13

have been made.

14

statute; and the Court concludes that these are without merit.

IS

We have many laws which indirectly affect privacy and family

16

sanctity but are not for that reason unconstitutional.

17

There are constitutional challenges to this

As far as due process and equal protection, statutes

18

and regulations are looked at under rational review standards;

19

and the Court finds that the statute and regulations that we've

20

been looking at this morning are rationally related to a

21

permissible goal of determining eligibility for Federal

22

benefits and of course trying to reduce payments under the

23

Deficit Reduction Act.

24
25

As to the 10th Amendment, I find no violation of the
10th Amendment from any of this in looking at the recent Garcia

1

v, San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority case, 105 Supreme

2

Court 1005, which is a 1985 case? and I don't see that there is

3

any problem.

4

So in conclusion, the Court will at this time grant in

5

part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary

6

judgment and grant in part and deny in part the defendants'

7

motion for summary judgment, as I've indicated, in that the

8

interpretation of the rule, which requires the income of

9

siblings or half-siblings under Title VII, child support or

10

other income to be considered as set forth in 42 United States

11

Cosde 602(a)(38), is a proper interpretation.

12

proper, the regulations are proper, and that statute is to be

13

followed and upheld*

14

The statute is

However, the Court further is convinced that Medicaid

15

is not to be discontinued or cut off merely because that

16

statute is, in fact, being followed; and the consideration of

17

the siblings' income is not going to affect the payment of

18

Medicaid,

19

regulations as to Medicaid, and that will be my ruling as to

20

the payment of Medicaid payments.

21

And that is my understanding of the statute and

How, more specifically, is there anything else that I

22

need to state rather than just the directions that the 602

23

section is to be considered in determining family unit and that

24

Medicaid payments ate not to be cut off in that consideration?

25

How more specifically would you like this Court's order to read?

10
Or Does that take care of it?
2

MR* CAGEt

tout Honor, I Just have a question about

3

how you wish us to proceed with the class.

4

been certified at this point) and obviously, given your ruling,

5

there would be some real problems with the class definition

6

proposed by Plaintiff.

7

evidence presented on any of the elements for class

8

certification*
THE COURT J

9

The class has not

And of course, there has been no

Let me just ask you this question:

In

10

view of my interpretation of the statute and the Medicaid

11

provisions, can my order be followed, assuming you're not going

12

to appeal—I don't know whether you are or not—statewide,

13

without actually the technical certifying of a class?

14

words, can payments just be adjusted?

15

another case that we had where we really did that, where we

16

really didn't certify the class but where my decision just

17

applied.

18

people who had retired from a second company.

19

whether you were Involved In that case ot not*

I'm trying to think of

That was a case involving Social Security payments of

20

MR. CAGE:

21

THE COURT:

I don't know

Must have been before my time, your Honor.
Must have been before your time.

22

actually didn't certify the class.

23

the state shall follow the Court's rulings on this.

24
25

In other

But I

I just said from now on,

Will that take care of this case, or do we have a lot
of people that are owed Medicaid payments because of these

11
1

rulings?

2

MR, LAWLORt

I think it might be productive for us to

3

have-an opportunity to confer to find out with regard to the

4

Medicaid aspect of this case.

5

agreement about reinstating people and making those

6

determinations! identifying that—

7
8

THE COURT:

You know, if we can work out an

And reconsidering of past refusal to pay

Medicaid where it really falls under this situation.

9

MR. LAWLORt

I'd be willing to have to the burden put

10

on us to come to the Court if we're not able to resolve things,

11

say—either ask for a status conference or move for class

12

relief if we're not able to work things out.

13

opportunity to work it out*
THE COURT:

14

I would like an

I think it could be worked out without

15

actually certifying Is a class and sending notice and doing all

16

the things that are going to cost both sides a lot of money.

17

I'd just as soon save the taxpayers some money, quite frankly.

18

MR. LAWLOR:

19

productive.

20

you.

21

I think making that effort would be

If we have problems, then we could come back to

THE COURT:

Can I have your assurance, Mr. Cage and

22

Ms. Oates, that you will confer and try to reach, if you c a n —

23

reach some sort of an agreement, because basically now you've

24

been applying this statute, the 602(a)(38).

25

MR. CAGE:

Right?

Yes, your Honor, all along.

12

1

THE COURT:

2

based on my ruling on that.

3

have to be as far as Medicaid is concerned.

So. nothing is going to have to be to done

MR. LAWLORJ
MR. CAGE:
6

The only adjustment is going to

That's correct.
Correct.

THE COURT:

Let's be very clear:

From this date on,

7

Medicaid payments shall be made in those cases; and the only

8

thing you really have to confer on is what has happened in the

9

i
past*

10
MR. LAWLOR:

Yes.

And one clarification is that the

11
Cordelia—I would ask that the Court direct that the State of
12
Colorado reinstate the Medicaid eligibility of the members of
13
the Cordelia Salazar family.
14
THE COURT:

Is there any reason I shouldn't do that in

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

view of my ruling?
MR* CAGE:
;

MR. LAKLOR:
THE COURT:

I think you've already done it, your Honor.
I just want to make that clear.
The Court specifically orders that the

Salazar family's Medicaid be reinstated.
Do we have that problem with Childress or with—What's
the other family?
MR. LAWLOR:

That also the reinstatement be effective

from the date that they were terminated.
THE COURT:

The Court will so order.

effective from the date they were terminated.

It will be
Do we have any

13
1

problem with the Childress family?
MR. CAGE:

2
3

your Honor.

4
5

They have not been terminated at this point,

THE COURT:

Medicaid has been continuing for the

Childresses?

6

MR. SOLEM:

And they're under a state administrative

7

ALJ action which interpreted differently DEFRA than you did, so

8

they've not required to have the other two children in the unit.

9

So I'm not sure exactly—I think that has to be worked out i n —

10

they've appealed that in state court and I think that has to be

11

worked out there.

12

THE COURT!

You mean the two children that were

13

included in the family unit under 602(a)(38) have not been

14

included in the Medicaid unit?

15

MR. SOLEM!

They haven't been included in the AEDC

16

filing unit, either.

17

regulation to apply only to needy children.

18

little—

The state ALJ interpreted the state
So we've got a

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CAGE:

21

conjunction with your order.

22

and pursuant to your order—it hasn't been terminated—and

23

they'll continue to receive it.

That's just a —
I don't think there is any problem in
They're still receiving Medicaid

24

MR. SOLEM:

That's correct.

25

THE COURT:

NOW, what about the other family?

14

1

MR. CAGE:

2

MR. LAWLOR:

3

THE COURT:

They haven't been terminated, your Honor.
There is no problem, Judge.
Okay.

Why don't you try to work it out.

4

I'd like to somehow be able to close this case, and we're going

5

to need a final judgment order to close it; and I can't do that

6

-until hopefully you work it out.

7

MR. LAWLORt

I would suggest, Judge—and I can accept

8

this burden to report to the Court on the progress in resolving

9

this remaining aspect of relief within 30 days.
THE COURT:

10
11

10.

12

time if you need to.

13

think is 30 days.

I was going to hope you were going to say

Do you really need 30 days to do it?

14

MR. LAWLOR:

15

THE COURT:

We'll give you the

By February—by February 12, which I

That's fine.
Report; and would you please either send

16

me something in writing or else if you need to talk to the

17

Court, do so through Phil Brimmer, my law clerk.

18

MR. LANLOR:

19

THE COURT:

20

Yes, Judge.
And we're going to need a final judgment,

as I say.

21

Are there going to be be other issues to be decided?

22

MR. LAWLOR:

23

THE COURT:

Attorneys fees, Judge.
Let's see if we can have any motions for

24

attorneys fees discussed prior to 30 days and see if you can

25

come up with a stipulation on those, too.

And if you can't,

15
1

I'll want—what I'll want at that 30-day period is a motion for

2

attorneys fees supported by very excellent, terrific, explicit,

3

detailed affidavits as to your time.

4

MR. LAWLOR:

5

THE COURT:

6

Ala the Ramos case.

If you read the Ramos

case, it says excrutiating detail.

7

MR. LAKLOR:

8

THE COURT:

9

I've got them.

I've got terrific records, judge.
That's what I want.

And at that time, I

think I would also like to see a suggested final order; and

10

maybe you can talk about that between you, too, how you want it

11

stated.

12

I take it some of these cases that have been cited to

13

me are up on appeal.

14

MR. LAWLOR:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CAGE:

17

If not all of them.
1 understand that the Creaton case out of

California is before the Ninth Circuit.

18
19

They are, Judge.

MR. LAWLOR:

Both Gorrle and White Horse are also

pending in the Eighth Circuit.

20

THE COURT:

You may consider whether you want to

21

appeal this or see what the other circuits do.

22

you, but we need that tight final judgment before an appeal

23

here.

24

is to be tied up by the 12th, hopefully, unless you have a

25

problem; and if you do, then I'll meet with you and we'll

That's up to

And I'll expect that also by the 12th, then.

Everything

16
1

either hold a heating or try to resolve It.

2

Anything else to put on the record?

3

MR* CAGE:

4

THE COURTS

5
6
7

this matter*

No, your Honor.
Thank you very much Cor your attention to

Court is in recess*

(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded and the Court
recessed at lit20 a.m.)
•

8
9

*

*

*
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